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ABSTRACT: Recent reforms in Australia, England, and the Netherlands have sought to 
enhance the quality and accessibility of primary care. Quality improvement strategies include 
postgraduate training programs for family physicians, accreditation of general practitioner 
(GP) practices, and efforts to modify professional behaviors—for example, through clinical 
guideline development. Strategies for improving access include national performance targets, 
greater use of practice nurses, assured after-hours care, and medical advice telephone lines. 
All three countries have established midlevel primary care organizations both to coordinate 
primary care health services and to serve other functions, such as purchasing and population 
health planning. Better coordination of primary health care services is also the objective driv-
ing the use of patient enrollment in a single general practice. Payment reform is also a key 
element of English and Australian reforms, with both countries having introduced payment-
for-quality initiatives. Dutch payment reform has stressed financial incentives for better man-
agement of chronic disease.
                    
With well-developed primary care systems that have track records of strong perfor-
mance, Australia, England, and the Netherlands offer some potentially useful lessons 
to the United States as it implements health care reforms. This brief outlines how 
primary care is provided in those three countries, it evaluates data on a range of pri-
mary care system performance indicators, and it examines the three countries’ major 
strategies for strengthening primary care:
•	 Promoting coordination of care
•	 Reforming primary care payment
•	 Improving quality and access. 
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PRIMARY CARE DELIVERY IN AUSTRALIA, 
ENGLAND, AND THE NETHERLANDS: 
BACKGROUND
Australia, England, and the Netherlands all provide 
universal access to primary care services that are free of 
charge to all (in England and the Netherlands) or to 
most patients (Australia). In all three countries, family 
physicians known as general practitioners (GPs) provide 
primary care services and act as “gatekeepers” for patients’ 
access to most specialist services and hospitals. This 
gatekeeper requirement places primary care at the center 
of the health system, effectively ensuring that almost all 
patients have a regular primary care doctor or GP group. 
Often, the patients need look no further—about nine of 
10 have their health care problems fully managed within 
general practice without referrals to medical specialists or 
hospitals. Thus all three countries have a strong primary 
care infrastructure based on three pillars: GPs operating 
as gatekeepers, encouragement of patient enrollment, 
and management of most health care needs by GPs (see 
Exhibit 1 for key elements of the countries’ primary care 
provisions). These three components are neither systemi-
cally encouraged nor commonly practiced in the United 
States. 
General practices in Australia, England, and the 
Netherlands are effectively small private businesses pro-
viding a range of family medicine services—including, 
for example, pediatrics, psychiatry, and geriatric services. 
These practices receive most or all of their funding from 
the government (Australia and England) or through 
universally mandated private insurance coverage (the 
Netherlands). 
One notable difference in primary care provision 
between the three countries is the average size of GP 
practices. Dutch practices tend to be smaller than their 
English and Australian counterparts, with 40 percent of 
Dutch GPs operating solo. In contrast, the share of GPs 
in solo practices in Australia has halved over the decade 
from 2000–01 to 2009–10, with about six of every 
10 practices now employing five or more GPs. Larger 
general practices have been fostered in Australia by the 
introduction in the late 1990s of general practice accredi-
tation and a trend toward “corporatization,” whereby 
commercial chains buy out solo practitioners and operate 
larger group practices in multiple locations.1,2 Another 
significant organizational change has been the grow-
ing presence of practice nurses, who now are part of the 
general-practice landscape in all three countries. 
Comparative Performance on  
Primary Care Access
The organization of primary care services in the three 
countries appears to be associated with improved perfor-
mance in primary care access. Exhibit 2 shows the relative 
performance of Australia, England, and the Netherlands, 
and contrasted with that of the United States, on a series 
of access measures from the Commonwealth Fund’s 2009 
international health policy survey of primary care physi-
cians. With the exception of Australian performance 
on same- or next-day access, all three countries perform 
better than the United States on this range of access 
measures. In particular, the United States lags consider-
ably behind the others in ensuring access to after-hours 
care and in providing a team-based approach to primary 
care. In addition to expediting timely access, the three 
countries’ increasing use of multidisciplinary teams in 
primary care is viewed as contributing significantly to 
better coordination and management of care for people 
with chronic disease.
In the United States, the holy grail of health 
policy has long been the achievement of improved access 
through universal coverage.3 As illustrated in Exhibit 2, 
access is no longer the paramount concern of health care 
policymakers in Australia, England, and the Netherlands 
(although some primary care access issues remain). 
Instead, the predominant policy discourse there involves 
how to achieve, or at least improve, health service inte-
gration—including horizontal integration across different 
types of primary care services and vertical integration 
across primary care physicians, specialists, and hospitals.4 
Other important primary care policy objectives in the 
three countries include quality improvement and long-
term sustainability (sometimes expressed as cost-effective-
ness and often involving new approaches to the delivery 
of primary care services). 
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Exhibit 1. Key Elements of the Primary Care Systems in Australia,  
England, and the Netherlands 
Key feature Australia England Netherlands
Enrollment of patients with a 
GP practice encouraged
No Yes Yes
Copayments for GP 
consultations
For about 80% of 
consultations with GPs, 
there is no copayment1
Zero copayment Zero copayment
Average size of GP practices Solo (9%)2
2–4 GPs (30%)
5–9 GPs (41%)
10+ GPs (20%)
Solo (15%)3
2–4 GPs (44%)
5–9 GPs (36%)
10+ GPs (5%)
Solo (40%)
2 GPs (32%)
3+ GPs (28%)5
Proportion of patients/
problems managed within 
general practice (without 
referral to specialists or 
hospitals)
88%2 90%4 98%6 
Practice nurses in GP 
practices
79% of GPs work in 
practices with at least one 
practice nurse2 
All practices have access to 
a practice nurse
85%–90% of GP practices have 
one part-time practice nurse 
(estimate)7
Payment of GPs Mainly fee-for-service Capitation and performance-
related pay plus some 
limited fee-for-service (e.g., 
for immunizations)
Mainly capitation, but with  
fee-for-service accounting for 
about one-third of payments 
Employment status of GPs Private practitioners Independent contractors 
(partners or salaried) 
Private GPs with own practice 
(75%); private GPs without 
practice (15%); salaried GPs 
(10%)5
Payment for quality Practice Incentives Program Quality and Outcomes 
Framework
Included in contracts with 
preferred health insurer
Provision of after-hours care Deputizing services (53%); 
by each practice (29%); or 
by cooperative arrangement 
between practices (18%)2
Provided mostly by 
cooperatives
Organized through regional 
cooperatives
Sources:
1 Medicare Australia, Medicare Bulk-Billing Statistics 2009–10, 2010, http://www.medicareaustralia.gov.au/provider/medicare/files/medicare-bulk-billing.pdf.
2 H. Britt et al., General Practice Activity in Australia 2000–2001 to 2009–2010: 10-Year Data Tables, 2010, Bettering the Evaluation and Care of Health (BEACH), Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare and University of Sydney: Canberra. Data are for 2009–10.
3 The NHS Information Centre, “General and Personal Medical Services, Detailed Results, England,” 2010, http://www.ic.nhs.uk/webfiles/publications/010_Workforce/
nhsstaff9909/GP/General%20Practice%20Staff%202009.%20Detailed%20Result.pdf. Data are as of Sept. 30, 2009.
4 Department of Health (U.K.), The Future Regulation of Health and Adult Social Care in England: A Consultation on the Framework for the Registration of Health and Adult Social 
Care Providers: Partial Impact Assessment on Primary Care, 2008. 
5 L. Hingstman and R. J. Kenens, Cijfers uit de registratie van huisartsen: peiling 2010 (Figures from Registration of General Practitioners: Survey 2010) (Utrecht: NIVEL 
(Netherlands Institute for Health Services Research), 2010), http://www.nivel.nl/oc2/page.asp?PageID=10959&path=/Startpunt/Home NIVEL/Publicaties.
6 M. Cardol, L. van Dijk, J. D. de Jong et al., Tweede Nationale Studie naar ziekten en verrichtingen in de huisartspraktijk. Huisartsenzorg: wat doet de poortwachter (Second 
National Study on Diseases and Interventions in General Practice. Primary Care: What Is the Gatekeeper Doing?) (Utrecht/Bilthoven: NIVEL/RIVM, 2004). 
7 Authors’ estimate.
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Against this backdrop of strong primary care 
systems, England and Australia are embarking on major 
changes to the operation and financing of general prac-
tice. These developments are a consequence of elections 
that resulted in changes of national government in 
Australia (in 2007) and England (in 2010). 
In sections that follow, we discuss the three major 
primary care reform strategies being implemented in the 
three countries: promoting coordination of care; reforming 
primary care payment; and improving quality and access. 
PROMOTING COORDINATION OF CARE 
Amid growing concerns about the rising prevalence of 
chronic diseases, governments in the three countries 
have implemented a range of structural approaches to 
promoting continuity of care of individual patients and 
to improving the integration of health services at an orga-
nizational or regional level. Common approaches have 
included patient enrollment and the creation of primary 
care organizations that operate at a regional level with a 
whole-population focus. 
Patient Enrollment
Enrollment of patients in a single general practice has 
been a long-standing feature of the English National 
Health Service,5 whereby patients are encouraged to reg-
ister with a GP and have the right to register with any 
local GP practice. However, they can be registered with 
only one practice at a time. One of the proposals for the 
health reforms currently under way in England is that 
patients will be free to enroll instead with a nonlocal 
practice. This reform may be particularly appealing to 
commuters, who will in future be able to register with a 
practice near their workplace. It is also designed to pro-
mote choice and competition among GP practices6  
(see box).
Exhibit 2. Access to Primary Care Services, 2009
Country
Doctors reporting 
that almost all 
patients can get 
same- or next-day 
access
Practice has 
arrangement for 
patients’ after-hours 
care to see  
doctor/nurse
Practice’s physicians, 
nurses, and medical 
assistants share 
responsibility for  
managing patients’ care
Australia 36% 50% 88%
Netherlands 62% 97% 91%
United Kingdom 64%  89%1 98%
United States 44% 29% 59%
1 In England, primary care trusts (PCTs) are legally required to ensure 24-hour access to a GP.
Source: Commonwealth Fund 2009 International Health Policy Survey of Primary Care Physicians. 
NHS Reforms in England
Soon after coming to power in 2010, the coalition government announced a set of radical reforms for the National Health 
Service (NHS) in England.7 Under the proposals, the fundamental principles of the NHS are untouched—namely, health 
care for all is funded from general taxation and free at the point of delivery. However, the proposals, which are decidedly pro-
market, are felt by some to amount to a substantial and potentially risky reorganization of the NHS.8
 In the future, NHS hospitals, private health care providers, and family doctors would all compete for patients. Primary 
care trusts and strategic health authorities would be scrapped, and instead GPs would form consortiums that controlled 
80 percent of the NHS budget. A new NHS commissioning board would oversee the consortiums and commission certain 
highly specialized health services. An economic regulator called the Monitor would promote competition, regulate prices, and 
safeguard the continuity of services.
 The proposals are proving highly contentious,9 and in April 2011 the government announced a two-month “listening 
exercise” to “pause, listen, reflect, and improve” the NHS reform plans.10 Following the release of a report on the listening 
exercise,11 the government has announced some refocusing of the proposed reforms. In particular, there is to be more 
balance between cooperation and competition, increased opportunities for clinical participation, and a phased and more 
flexible approach to the implementation of the reforms.12
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In the Netherlands in 2006, patient enrollment 
was made mandatory for the whole population. This 
regulation operates in parallel with other health reforms, 
such as the obligation of all adults to buy health insur-
ance (children up to age 18 are insured for free). Before 
2006, only patients with incomes below a certain level 
and covered by social health insurance were obliged to 
register (with one practice). As that group constituted 
about two-thirds of the Dutch population, the change in 
2006 was not perceived as dramatic.13 
Patient enrollment is more controversial in 
Australia. The Australian Medical Association is strongly 
opposed to enrollment, arguing that it limits patient 
choice, interferes with the doctor–patient relationship, 
and places GPs in a position where they may be forced 
to ration services.14,15 Enrollment would also represent a 
potentially significant shift in payment arrangements for 
GPs, moving from an open-ended (by price and volume) 
fee-for-service system to some capping of GP payments. 
Recent reform proposals to introduce patient 
enrollment in Australia have been progressively watered 
down. In 2009, the National Health and Hospitals 
Reform Commission (NHHRC, an independent inquiry 
established by the Australian government) recommended 
the introduction of voluntary enrollment in a single pri-
mary health care service only for certain groups (includ-
ing people with chronic conditions and indigenous 
Australians), estimated at about 7 million people.16 To 
counter the expected opposition, the NHHRC enroll-
ment proposals were based on the continuation of fee-
for-service payments—complemented by new outcome 
payments and other grants to support enrolled patients—
and on the long-term development of episodic payments 
that bundle enrolled patients’ cost of care. 
In May 2010, the Australian government 
announced that voluntary enrollment would commence 
in 2012–13, but only for people with diabetes, and it 
estimated that about 260,000 people would be enrolled 
by mid-2014.17 However, in November 2010 the govern-
ment indicated that even this limited rollout of enroll-
ment would be deferred; instead, there would be a three-
to-four-year pilot of coordinated care for diabetes, due to 
commence in 2011.18 
Primary Care Organizations
A second major approach to improving coordination 
of care has been the establishment of primary care 
organizations. They include primary care trusts (PCTs) 
in England (shortly to be abolished in favor of new 
GP-commissioning consortiums announced under the 
2010 reforms), divisions of general practice in Australia 
(due to be replaced by Medicare Locals by July 2012), 
and regional GP cooperatives in the Netherlands. Exhibit 
3 summarizes these primary care organizations in the 
three countries.
Despite similarities in the sizes of the populations 
they serve, these organizations have evolved very differ-
ently. On a scale of increasing complexity:
•	 The Dutch GP cooperatives are directly involved 
in providing care to patients. 
•	 The Australian organizations provide infrastruc-
tural support and tools for GPs but have no direct 
service delivery role for patients. 
•	 The English primary care organizations have had 
various roles, which include providing community 
health services, planning and developing new pri-
mary health care and public health services, con-
tracting with GPs, and commissioning secondary 
health services.
Of the three countries, the simplest model of a 
primary care organization is the Dutch GP cooperatives, 
which are regional entities usually located within or near 
hospitals. Their main role is to provide after-hours care, 
though they have also evolved to support GP practices; 
as such, they may offer a range of administrative, infor-
mation technology (IT), and professional services to GP 
practices. More recently, they have entered into contracts 
with health insurers to provide disease management ser-
vices for patients. Reflecting their local origins, there is 
diversity among GP cooperatives in regard to these sec-
ondary functions. For example:
•	 The Veenendaal GP cooperative directly employs 
practice nurses so that patients with chronic dis-
eases may more readily receive health education 
and counseling.19
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Exhibit 3. Primary Care Organizations in Australia, England, and the Netherlands
Country: 
Organization Establishment
Population 
size Roles Funding 
Australia: 
Divisions of  
general practice
Early 1990s Average of 
200,0001
Provide services and support to 
general practices at the local level 
(includes IT support, professional 
development and education, projects 
to improve service integration)
Core funding by 
the Australian 
government, with 
additional project 
funding 
Australia:  
Medicare Locals2 
About 15 (one-quarter) 
were due to start 
in July 2011, 15 in 
January 2012, and  
32 in July 2012
Estimated 
average of 
380,000
Improve coordination of primary 
health care in local communities; 
undertake local health planning and 
address service gaps 
Anticipated to 
be about $170 
million (US$180 
million) annually 
in core funding 
from the Australian 
government 
England:  
Primary care trusts 
(PCTs)
Primary care groups 
(established in 1997) 
evolved into primary 
care trusts (1999)3
Average of 
300,0004 
Improve the health and well-being 
of the local population and reduce 
health inequalities. Within allocated 
resources, must contract and pay 
for a comprehensive range of health 
services for the population. These 
services must be of high quality, 
responsive, and efficient, and must 
span all service sectors (primary, 
secondary, and community health 
care). Until March 31, 2011, PCTs 
also directly provided community 
health services. 
“Responsible” for 
£80 billion (US$130 
billion), or 80% of 
NHS budget4
England:  
GP-commissioning 
consortia5
Shadow consortia to 
commence in 2011–12, 
with full operation 
beginning in April 2013
Still to be 
determined 
Be responsible for commissioning 
most NHS services, including acute 
hospital care, community health 
care, and rehabilitation services. 
The National Commissioning 
Board will commission certain 
highly specialized services and will 
authorize GP consortiums.
To be funded 
by the National 
Commissioning 
Board according to 
a person-based risk-
adjusted formula6 
The Netherlands:  
GP cooperatives7
GP cooperatives grew 
out of local GP rosters 
for after-hours care in 
about 2000 
100,000–
500,000 
Provide after-hours care; coordinate 
disease management
After-hours care 
is funded under 
the “basic care 
package”; GP 
cooperatives 
receive extra 
payments 
for disease 
management under 
contracts with health 
insurers.
Sources:
1 Based on 111 Divisions and Australian population of about 22.5 million as of March 2011. 
2 Department of Health and Ageing, Guidelines for the Establishment and Initial Operation of Medicare Locals (Canberra: Australian Government, 2011).
3 J. McDonald, G. Powell Davies, J. Cumming et al., “What Can the Experiences of Primary Care Organisations in England, Scotland and New Zealand Suggest about the 
Potential Role of Divisions of General Practice and Primary Care Networks/Partnerships in Addressing Australian Challenges?,” Australian Journal of Primary Health, 2007 
12(2):46–55.
4 Kings Fund, What Can We Learn from Previous Commissioning Models?, 2010, http://www.kingsfund.org.uk/current_projects/the_nhs_white_paper/gp_commissioning.html.
5 Department of Health, Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2010).
6 Nuffield Trust, Developing a Person-Based Resource Allocation Formula for Allocations to General Practice in England (London: The Nuffield Trust, 2010). 
7 M. Willekens, P. Giesen, E. Plat et al., “Quality of Out-of-Hours Primary Care in the Netherlands: Adherence to National Guidelines,” BMJ Quality & Safety, Jan. 5, 2011.
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•	 The Middle Brabant GP cooperative assists GP 
practices with accreditation, IT support, personnel 
management, and data collection and feedback.20 
The clarity of purpose of GP cooperatives—
focused mainly on providing after-hours care—is proba-
bly a testament to their “bottom-up” origins. The growth 
of GP cooperatives in the Netherlands was a response to 
growing dissatisfaction with the difficulties experienced 
by small GP practices in providing after-hours care on an 
individual basis or via call rotations among groups of five 
to 10 GPs.21 While GP cooperatives were established on a 
voluntary basis, this change was supported with financial 
incentives through reimbursement of organizational and 
material costs. As shown above in Exhibit 2, GP coopera-
tives have been highly successful in improving access to 
after-hours care. Their success is consistent with the low 
rates of avoidable hospital admissions in the Netherlands 
compared with those of most other European countries.22 
The success of Dutch GP cooperatives in achiev-
ing high-quality after-hours access can be attributed to 
several factors.23 First, after-hours services are obtained 
through a single regional telephone number for each GP 
cooperative, with most services situated close to hospi-
tals. About 45 percent of after-hours consultations are 
telephone-only, another 40 percent involve patient visits 
to the GP cooperative, and the remaining 15 percent 
result in a home visit by a GP. Second, continuity of care 
is strongly promoted through shared electronic health 
records, with the patient’s usual general practice receiv-
ing information on any after-hours consultations so as to 
ensure a complete patient record. Third, nurses undertak-
ing telephone triage at the GP cooperative have access to 
national evidence-based clinical guidelines.
Turning to Australia, divisions of general prac-
tice were established by the federal government in the 
early 1990s with very wide-ranging objectives, including 
providing professional support for GPs, promoting the 
involvement of GPs in local health planning, and encour-
aging integration between general practice and other 
health services. Annual surveys of these divisions illustrate 
the range and diversity of the roles they undertake. For 
example, in 2007–08:
•	 94 percent of divisions contracted with allied 
health professionals to deliver services to patients.
•	 95 percent of divisions were involved in at least 
one structured “shared care” program, defined as 
a collaborative approach to coordinating patient 
care across specialist and primary care providers. 
•	 99 percent of divisions engaged in activities to 
improve collaboration between GPs and hospi-
tals, such as improving notification of hospital 
admission/discharge.
•	 87 percent of divisions provided support to 
GP practices in the use of clinical information 
systems. 
•	 100 percent of divisions provided support to prac-
tice nurses, who were mainly employed directly 
by GP practices, with the support including edu-
cation, mentoring, and induction into general 
practice.24
The diversity of these functions is mirrored 
in their funding arrangements. Divisions receive core 
funding from the Australian government, though most 
of their funding is tied to the delivery of projects or is 
conditional on service enhancements under numerous 
incentive programs. For example, some divisions have 
been funded to employ allied health staff in rural areas in 
order to improve access to services such as physiotherapy. 
A 2007 evaluation found that divisions had accounted 
for statistically significant improvements in general prac-
tice infrastructure (such as the employment of practice 
nurses and IT support) and influenced up to about two-
thirds of the change in selected primary care performance 
measures.25 
In response to a recommendation by the National 
Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, these divi-
sions were scheduled to be replaced by new “Medicare 
Locals” over a year’s time (from July 2011 to July 2012). 
The Commission’s argument was that a comprehensive 
primary care platform should involve integration across 
8 The Commonwealth Fund
GPs and other primary health care service providers (such 
as nurses, allied health practitioners, community mental 
health services, maternity and early childhood services, 
and Aboriginal health workers). Accordingly, the new 
Medicare Locals will have more diverse membership 
across the full range of primary care providers, as opposed 
to focusing on general practice alone. The Australian gov-
ernment’s guidelines for the establishment of Medicare 
Locals include five strategic objectives:
•	 Improve the patient journey through the develop-
ment of integrated and coordinated services.
•	 Provide support to clinicians and service providers 
so as to improve patient care.
•	 Identify the health needs of local areas and the 
development of locally focused and responsive 
services.
•	 Facilitate implementation and successful per-
formance of primary health care initiatives and 
programs.
•	 Be efficient and accountable, with strong gover-
nance and effective management.26
However, there remains considerable uncertainty 
as to how these broad objectives will be translated into 
specific roles and functions. In addition, the Australian 
Medical Association is opposed to Medicare Locals 
administering budgets and taking on a purchasing role, as 
the primary care trusts (PCTs) in England do.
In many ways, English PCTs are more estab-
lished and influential than their Australian or Dutch 
counterparts. Their prominence derives from their sig-
nificant role in managing health expenditures within 
the National Health Service. Major changes to primary 
care trusts have been cyclical, often following changes 
of government, and have shifted purchasing power back 
and forth between general practices and trusts. However, 
the underlying philosophy over the past two decades has 
been based on an internal NHS market, with different 
providers competing to provide services to NHS patients. 
One major change of note has been a move from reliance 
on central government planning to a model driven by the 
purchasing of health services at a local level—whether 
undertaken by general practices, primary care trusts, or 
health authorities and their various iterations. 
Primary care trusts (or primary care groups, 
as they were originally called) were established by the 
incoming Labour government in the late 1990s as an 
alternative to the previous government’s policy of fund-
holding by individual general practices.27 PCTs were 
theoretically able to overcome one of the weaknesses of 
GP fund-holding, namely the increased management and 
transaction costs experienced by small groups of GPs.28 
In 2006, when the number of PCTs was reduced from 
303 to 152 to create larger PCTs, this was an acknowl-
edgment that management costs were still too high; it 
was also a response to concerns that not enough staff 
with sophisticated commissioning skills were available.29 
However, the government also hedged its bets by intro-
ducing “practice-based commissioning” in 2005, whereby 
GPs received “indicative” budgets to commission services. 
These budgets were termed indicative because the PCTs 
actually held and administered the funds. This provision 
was designed to overcome some GPs’ lack of engagement 
with PCTs as well as to strengthen clinical input into 
decisions about the purchase of health services. 
This backdrop of cyclical policy change concern-
ing the commissioning role of GPs versus that of PCTs 
forms the context for the new coalition government’s 
proposal for radical reforms of the English NHS.
Performance on Care Coordination
The Commonwealth Fund’s international surveys pro-
vide some insight into the performance on coordination 
of care in Australia, England, and the Netherlands versus 
that of the United States. Exhibit 4 shows the 2008 sur-
vey’s reported levels of coordination problems involving 
medical tests or records of adults with chronic conditions.
Of course, it is difficult to attribute these specific 
results to particular reforms such as patient enrollment 
or the establishment of primary care organizations. Many 
factors may contribute to improved coordination of care, 
including the adoption of clinical guidelines, enhanced 
electronic record systems, new payment arrangements, 
and greater use of multidisciplinary teams. Nonetheless, 
Strengthening Primary Care: Recent Reforms in Australia, England, and the Netherlands 9
Exhibit 4 suggests that the first three countries have fewer 
coordination problems than does the United States. It 
is also noteworthy that the 2008 Commonwealth Fund 
survey found that in all of the countries evaluated, lower 
rates of coordination problems were reported when fewer 
doctors were seen (one to two doctors versus four or 
more). This situation is more likely to occur in Australia, 
England, and the Netherlands, owing to the gatekeeping 
role of the general practices described above. 
REFORMING PRIMARY CARE PAYMENT 
Payment has been a major element of primary care 
reform in all three countries studied. There have been 
payment-related initiatives in general practice to help 
improve the management of chronic diseases, engage 
in preventive health interventions, and encourage high-
quality care. Using GP payments as an incentive for 
desired behaviors—a relatively new concept in these three 
countries—is occurring through the use of “blended” 
payment approaches in which new forms of payment are 
introduced but coexist with the predominantly capita-
tion-based system (in England and the Netherlands) or 
fee-for-service (in Australia).
Paying for Quality in England and 
Australia
The most comprehensive and well-studied approach to 
GP payment reform is the English model, where the 
payment-for-quality scheme is known as the Quality 
and Outcomes Framework (QOF). Exhibit 5 compares 
the main elements of the QOF with the equivalent 
Australian scheme—the Practice Incentives Program 
(PIP). The Netherlands is not included in the exhibit 
because payment-for-quality programs have been intro-
duced in only a few regions as experimental studies. 
While the QOF is a relative newcomer, it dwarfs 
the PIP in terms of the breadth of domains included 
in its payment framework and the magnitudes of its 
potential payments. The unusually high payments avail-
able through the QOF, which can constitute as much 
as one-third of a practice’s income, reflect the context 
of its introduction and implementation. The QOF was 
introduced as part of the new General Medical Services 
contract, which was intended to improve GPs’ pay, 
conditions, and satisfaction. Having made a decision to 
substantially increase the funding available to general 
practices, the government chose to make it conditional 
on performance—based in turn on quality indicators 
(originally 146, currently 131).30 In reality, practices 
faced very limited real risk to their incomes because the 
indicator targets were set at what turned out to be read-
ily achievable levels. For example, practices were scoring 
more than 95 percent of available points under the QOF 
by 2006–07,31 thereby reducing the income volatility 
that might otherwise be expected with large fractions of 
at-risk payments. 
The Australian PIP payments represent a much 
smaller share (5.5 percent in 2008–09) of government 
funding for general practice. And although PIP pay-
ments initially represented a significant share of practice 
income, the Australian government’s spending on gen-
eral practice has increased at a faster rate than have PIP 
expenditures, thereby eroding the value of PIP to general 
practice.32
While not introduced with the same fanfare as 
the QOF, the Australian Practice Incentives Program is a 
Exhibit 4. Coordination Problems with Medical Tests or Records in the Past Two Years 
(adults with chronic conditions)
Country
Test results/records not 
available at time of appointment
Duplicate tests: Doctors ordered 
test that had already been done
Australia 16% 12%
Netherlands 11% 4%
England 15% 7%
United States 24% 20%
Source: C. Schoen, R. Osborn, S. K. H. How et al., “In Chronic Condition: Experiences of Patients with Complex Health Care Needs, in Eight Countries, 2008,” Health Affairs Web 
Exclusive, Nov. 13, 2008. 
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well-established part of payment arrangements for qual-
ity in general practice. The core elements of PIP relate to 
improved management of patients with asthma and dia-
betes and to increased uptake of cervical screening; these 
goals are encouraged through a complex mix of sign-on 
payments (indicating commitment to patient registers, 
recall and reminder systems, and guidelines on the rec-
ommended cycle of care33), and service incentive pay-
ments (reflecting delivery of agreed-upon cycles of care 
for each patient). Most recently, a new e-health payment 
has been included under the PIP that rewards practices 
for having a secure messaging capability, the capacity to 
transfer sensitive personal health information, and elec-
tronic access to clinical resources.
PIP payments coexist with other incentive 
arrangements under the Medicare Benefits Schedule. 
These other incentives include provision of additional 
payments to GPs for the multidisciplinary management 
of patients with chronic disease, and partial reimburse-
ment of patients for consultations with some allied 
health practitioners. As with other incentive programs, 
the PIP has been criticized for increasing the administra-
tive burden on general practice; as a result, reviews now 
occur at a reasonable frequency and the program has 
been amended.34 In any case, most participating practices 
believe that the PIP has contributed to quality care and 
improved access, and this view has been supported in 
recent evaluations of the program.35 For example, there 
is better compliance with recommended cycles of care 
for the management of patients with moderate or severe 
asthma.
Exhibit 5. General Practice “Payment for Quality” Frameworks in England and Australia
Feature
Quality and Outcomes Framework 
(England)
Practice Incentives Program 
(Australia)
Year of introduction 2004 1998
Domains included in 
the payment-for-quality 
framework 
Comprises four domains (4th revision):
Clinical care (87 indicators covering 20 chronic 
diseases or conditions)
Organizational (34 indicators spanning 
records, information for patients, education and 
training, practice management, and medicines 
management)
Patient experience (1 indicator related to length 
of consultations)
Additional services (9 indicators related to 
cervical screening, child health surveillance, 
maternity services, and contraception)
Comprises three domains:
Quality stream (5 incentives relating to 
prescribing, diabetes, cervical screening, 
asthma, and Indigenous health)
Capacity stream (5 incentives relating to 
e-health, practice nurses, after-hours care, 
teaching, and aged-care access)
Rural support stream (3 incentives including 
rural loading, procedural GPs, and domestic 
violence)
Share of GP payments Accounted for more than 25% of income for 
contractor (nonsalaried) GPs in 2006–071
Accounted for 5.5% of government funding for 
general practice in 2008–092
Average payment Average payment was more than £26,000 
(US$42,108) per contractor GP in 2006–071
Average payment was AUS$61,600 (US$65,111) 
per practice, or AUS$19,700 (US$20,823) per 
full-time-equivalent GP in participating practices 
in 2008–092
Eligibility criterion All practices are eligible, but payments are 
made to GP contractors, not salaried GPs
Practice must be accredited or registered for 
accreditation 
Proportion of all practices 
participating in the  
payment scheme
In 2009–10, practices represented 99.7% of 
registered patients in England2
Estimated to be 67% of all practices in 2007–
08 (equivalent to all accredited practices), 
providing almost 82% of GP patient care3
Sources:
1 T. Doran and M. Roland, “Lessons from Major Initiatives to Improve Primary Care in the United Kingdom,” Health Affairs, May 2010 29(5):1023–29. 
2 NHS Information Centre, Available, www.qof.ic.nhs.uk/faqs/#qof14.
3 Australian National Audit Office, Practice Incentives Program, Audit Report No. 5, 2010–11 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2010).
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As compared with the PIP, the QOF has a much 
stronger focus on clinical quality, with extensive coverage 
of a wide range of chronic conditions and a requirement 
for practices to establish disease registers. While both 
frameworks include process indicators such as the mea-
surement of blood pressure, the QOF is more advanced 
than the PIP in including outcome measures such as tar-
gets for cholesterol levels in diabetes patients. 
The QOF would appear to be superior to the PIP 
in at least two other dimensions: public reporting of the 
performance of individual general practices; and a robust 
process for including new indicators and refining or dis-
continuing existing indicators. 
Patients in England can access information on 
how their GP practice compares with other practices 
in the region or nationally—for example, in managing 
people with chronic diseases or in need of palliative care 
services.36 The value of this public reporting may be 
questionable: The National Quality Board has argued 
that, given uniformly high scores, the QOF “is not suffi-
ciently able to discriminate between performance” among 
general practices.37 Meanwhile, public reporting on PIP 
is limited to identifying the national participation rates 
for each of the PIP incentives, with no published data 
available on achievement against performance measures 
or on outcomes.38  
Finally, in England, the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence manages an evidence-
based and consultative process to develop and review the 
QOF clinical indicators. In Australia, there is no equiva-
lent mechanism. The Australian National Audit Office 
has criticized the lack of an overall strategy for evaluating 
the PIP, including the validity of specific performance 
indicators and benchmarking regimes.39 
Payment Reform in the Netherlands
Payment reforms in Dutch primary care have been par-
ticularly driven by the goal of reducing inequity among 
patients. The challenge is to find the right balance 
between capitation and fee-for-service. The capitation 
rate should be sufficient to offset the costs and invest-
ments needed, whereas the fee-for-service model should 
help GPs offer sufficient volume of care and prevent 
negligence. Additional financial incentives have been 
introduced by health insurers to improve the quality of 
care in patients with chronic disease, including the del-
egation of tasks to practice nurses, in accordance with the 
Chronic Care Model.40 Insurers pay GPs additional fees 
on a quarterly basis (about €40–€50 [US$65–$81] per 
patient with chronic disease), with GPs required to report 
against corresponding performance indicators. However, 
the maximum budget and most prices for primary care 
services are still determined by the government, which 
could be deemed as conflicting with the introduction of 
market principles—another driving force of the 2006 
health reforms.
As part of the health policy to strengthen primary 
care, stakeholders in primary care have argued for abol-
ishing budget caps; they suggest that higher volumes of 
primary care could reduce the total health budget, as 
prices for primary care are lower than those for hospital 
care. The debate about the budget continues, however, 
and is being complicated by the European financial 
crisis, which has affected the Dutch health care system. 
Nevertheless, Dutch citizens are satisfied with that sys-
tem, and large reforms are not felt to be necessary.41
IMPROVING QUALITY AND ACCESS 
Many of the reforms discussed under the first two strate-
gies may also improve the quality and accessibility of pri-
mary care, whether at the level of individual patients or 
through strengthening the infrastructure of the primary 
care system. 
The third strategy reflects the myriad other reform 
initiatives being used to directly drive improvements in 
primary care quality and access in the three countries. 
This strategy recognizes that improvements to quality 
and access require multilayered approaches; there is no 
single solution that can uniquely strengthen primary care. 
For example, policymakers can choose to:
•	 implement new funding models and financial 
incentives;
•	 craft regulations;
•	 institute changes to organization and governance;
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•	 conduct educational and public information 
campaigns;
•	 influence professional norms and behaviors;
•	 change health workforce roles; or
•	 strengthen consumer engagement and 
participation. 
Other Reforms Influencing the Quality of 
Primary Care
Regulation is a mainstay of efforts in all three countries 
to improve quality of primary care, with measures rang-
ing from the establishment of general practices, owned 
and operated by GPs, to oversight of their ongoing 
operation (Exhibit 6). The entry requirements for gen-
eral practice have been considerably strengthened with 
the introduction of postgraduate training programs for 
GPs, known as “vocational training.” These programs 
date from the 1970s in England and the Netherlands; 
the much-later introduction of vocational training in 
Australia was linked to access to higher Medicare rebates 
and hence to higher incomes for GPs. Vocational training 
specifies that practicing doctors undertake further exten-
sive training to attain registration as vocationally trained 
GPs. In addition to raising professional standards, voca-
tional registration is important to improving the status of 
general practice, which is now effectively recognized as a 
medical specialty. 
Of the three countries, Australia has the longest 
track record of encouraging accreditation of general prac-
tices. Standards were developed by the Royal Australian 
College of General Practitioners in the early 1990s, with 
accreditation introduced on a voluntary basis. There are 
two agencies that accredit general practice,42 which has 
one of the highest accreditation rates of all Australian 
health services for which accreditation is voluntary;43 the 
main reason for seeking this status is to gain access to 
additional PIP funding.44 
The Netherlands is also considering linking 
accreditation to payment contracts with insurers, which 
may increase accreditation rates; only about one-quarter 
of general practices were accredited in 2010. Recent 
reforms in England will dramatically alter the accredita-
tion landscape, with all general practices required to reg-
ister with the Care Quality Commission as of April 2012. 
This change is occurring in parallel with the development 
of a voluntary accreditation scheme by the Royal College 
of General Practitioners that will assess practices on non-
clinical aspects of care. 
Exhibit 6. Selected Reforms Affecting General Practice Quality:  
Australia, England, and the Netherlands
Quality initiative Australia England Netherlands
Vocational training  
for GPs
Introduced in 1993, 
currently three years
Three-year postgraduate training 
for GPs became mandatory from 
1976;1 due to increase to five 
years in 2011
Introduced 1973 (one-year 
training), expanded to three years 
in the 1990s
Accreditation of  
general practice
Introduced in early 1990s, 
with two accreditation 
agencies formed in  
mid-1990s
Voluntary accreditation scheme 
scheduled to be launched in 2011, 
plus all practices will be required 
to register with Care Quality 
Commission in 20121
Introduced in 2005; about 25% 
of practices accredited in 2010; 
practice visitation due to become 
mandatory in 2011
National quality agency Australian Commission 
on Safety and Quality  
in Health Care
Care Quality Commission Introduction of a National Quality 
Institute planned in 2013
Roles/approach of 
national quality agency
Leadership, education, 
and advocacy; public 
reporting (no regulatory 
functions)
Regulation, inspection, and 
monitoring of standards; 
registration of health services 
Regulation, coordination, and 
monitoring of standards; public 
reporting
1 The King’s Fund, Improving the Quality of Care in General Practice (London: The King’s Fund, 2011).
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Beyond working through regulation, other quality 
reforms are based on influencing professional norms and 
behaviors; one example is the use of clinical guidelines. 
This has been a very strong element of Dutch efforts to 
improve primary care quality over the past two decades, 
with over 80 evidence-based guidelines having been 
developed and updated regularly by the Dutch College 
of General Practitioners.45 These guidelines are dissemi-
nated to all GPs in the Netherlands through the College’s 
scientific journal, and they are integrated into continu-
ing medical education programs, practice accreditation 
processes, and local peer group meetings. Adherence 
to clinical guidelines is regularly monitored through a 
sample of Dutch general practices, with results indicating 
that adherence to primary care guidelines is better in the 
Netherlands than in England or the United States.46
Benchmarking of primary care can be undertaken 
in a way that encourages professional engagement, or it 
can be quasi-regulatory in nature, with a focus on per-
formance management. Australia offers an example of 
primary care benchmarking that is based on engendering 
professional support. Called the Australian Primary Care 
Collaboratives,47 the program includes an 18-month 
cycle comprising measurement of baseline performance 
of participating practices, learning workshops, and 
action periods during which practices undertake quality 
improvement activities. Since 2005, more than 1,000 
Australian general practices have participated, with dem-
onstrated improvements in the management of chronic 
disease and access to primary care.48 
Other Reforms Influencing Access to 
Primary Care
Access to primary care is multidimensional. Problems 
with access can derive from the range of choice of pro-
vider, continuity of care, the timeliness with which care 
is provided, the extent to which there is continuity, the 
availability of primary care after hours, and geographic 
proximity and travel time to the source of care (especially 
critical in rural and remote locations). 
In theory, Australia’s reliance on fee-for-service 
remuneration of general practitioners should create 
stronger incentives to increase the volume of primary 
care services provided, as compared with the predomi-
nantly capitation-based systems of England and the 
Netherlands. In practice, however, all three countries are 
facing significant access challenges resulting from aging 
populations, increased prevalence of chronic disease, and 
reduced access to GP services because of factors such as 
shorter working weeks and more part-time staff. 
England is the only one of the three countries to 
have used national performance targets to drive improve-
ments in timely access to general practice. Until the 
recent abolition of these targets by the new government, 
patients were guaranteed access to a primary care pro-
fessional within 24 hours and to a primary care doctor 
within 48 hours. In a 2009–10 GP patient survey, 79 
percent of respondents indicated that they were able to 
see a GP on the same day or within two days.49 
One important strategy for improving primary 
care access has been to expand the number and mix of 
general practice staff who share the primary care work-
load. As shown in Exhibit 1, most general practices in all 
three countries now employ or regularly contract with 
practice nurses. It has been estimated that the share of 
English general practice consultations undertaken by 
practice nurses increased from 21 percent in 1995/1996 
to 35 percent in 2008–09.50 Australian Medicare data 
indicate that more than 7 million practice nurse ser-
vices are claimed annually, at a cost to the government 
of AUS$83 million (US$88 million). This expense is 
relatively minor (compared with the total of 117 mil-
lion GP service items, entailing government expenditure 
of AUS$4.85 billion [US$5.13 billion]51), though these 
data on practice nurses significantly understate their con-
tribution to Australian general practice, as Medicare does 
not record their input to many services billed by GPs.52 
Approaches to improving after-hours access to pri-
mary care services, described earlier (Exhibit 1), include 
a mix of formal deputizing mechanisms, collaborative 
arrangements across small groups of practices, and larger 
regional cooperatives. One important element of the 
Dutch regional cooperatives model is the reliance on tele-
phone call centers for after-hours care (equivalent to U.S. 
medical advice lines); these entities are staffed mainly by 
nurses who triage patients using national guidelines. As 
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with practice nurses, health call centers are a relatively 
recent development, but they now contribute substan-
tially to improving access and managing the primary care 
workload in all three countries. 
The largest health call center internationally is 
England’s NHS Direct, which commenced operations in 
1998 and achieved national coverage in 2000. In 2009–
10, NHS Direct answered about 5 million phone calls, 
with an estimated reduction of some 2.4 million appoint-
ments with GPs and other primary care services.53 Health 
call centers are part of the broader trend toward encour-
aging self-management in primary care. There is also the 
Internet; about 5 million people annually use the online 
health and symptom checkers on the NHS Direct Web 
site. In Australia, state-based health call centers started in 
1999 (HealthDirect in Western Australia), with national 
coverage achieved in the mid-2000s.54 
Another important trend has been government 
support of initiatives that enhance access to a broader 
range of primary care services or that encourage better 
integration between primary care and specialist services. 
The 2006 English “Care Closer to Home” policy encour-
aged the development of polyclinics—one-stop shops 
that provide a broad range of services, not only general 
practice but also including community mental health, 
prenatal and postnatal care, community care, and spe-
cialist advice. The Australian equivalents, known as “GP 
super clinics,” were introduced in 2007. GP super clinics 
are intended to offer a more extensive range of primary 
care services in one location, where there also is access to 
visiting medical specialists, extended hours, and signifi-
cant capacity for interprofessional clinical training. While 
polyclinics and GP super clinics have been opposed 
by the national medical associations in England and 
Australia—on the basis that governments should not pro-
vide subsidies to new practices that compete with existing 
businesses—they represent a fundamental shift from the 
cottage industry of traditional general practice.
INSIGHTS FOR HEALTH REFORM 
ELSEWHERE
This review of Australia’s, England’s, and the Netherlands’ 
recent reforms and achievements in primary care can 
help guide others—the United States, for example—as 
they invest in and try to strengthen their own, sometimes 
underdeveloped, primary care services. 
First, and fundamentally, all three countries have 
elevated the status of primary care by making GPs the 
gatekeepers through which patients gain access to most 
specialist and hospital services. The value of this under-
pinning policy—which is long-standing and not part 
of recent reforms—is reflected in the very high success 
rates (greater than 90 percent) of GPs managing patients 
without referral to more costly services such as specialists 
and hospitals. These rates, along with the intense utiliza-
tion of health call centers and of practice nurses, testify 
to the value of primary care as the bedrock of the health 
care system and to the importance of investing in a broad 
primary care infrastructure.
A second lesson is that continuity of care in 
England and the Netherlands has been facilitated 
through patient enrollment in a single general practice, 
similar to a “medical home” in the United States. The 
Dutch model of using regionally shared electronic health 
records in after-hours care is particularly impressive. 
While patient enrollment in such practices is hasppening 
slowly in Australia, there may be some boost to continu-
ity of care with the 2012 introduction of voluntary and 
personally controlled electronic health records.
Third, primary care has been made an attractive 
career choice for new medical practitioners. Its status as a 
distinct specialty has been raised through the implemen-
tation of vocational training and registration schemes, 
while governments have also invested strongly in pri-
mary care. In England, the government has significantly 
increased the remuneration of GPs while also allowing 
individual practices to opt out of providing after-hours 
care as long as they make alternative arrangements to 
ensure such access. The Australian government has essen-
tially paid GPs more to employ practice nurses, thereby 
allowing them to hand over routine and nonclinical 
tasks. Additional investments in general practice in the 
Netherlands have been aimed at better coordination of 
care for patients with chronic diseases.
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Fourth, all three countries have introduced 
changes to transform general practice from a cottage 
industry to what has been termed a postindustrial 
model—based on the three core elements of standard-
ized care, performance measurement, and transparent 
reporting.55 Examples of this shift include the payment-
for-quality schemes in England and Australia, the strong 
reliance on clinical guidelines in the Netherlands, the 
encouragement of best practice through the Australian 
Primary Care Collaboratives, and England’s public 
reporting of general practice performance against QOF 
indicators. 
Fifth, and closely related to the shift from a cot-
tage industry, governments in all three countries have 
either directly intervened (England and Australia) or 
supported developments (the Netherlands) to improve 
the economies of scale of general practice. The three 
countries are also taking steps to aid integration both 
within primary care and between primary care and 
other health services. These developments include the 
establishment of primary care organizations as a sup-
porting infrastructure for individual general practices 
and the implementation of new models of primary care 
provision—for example, the polyclinics and GP federa-
tions in England and the GP super clinics in Australia. 
The Dutch GP cooperatives have the benefit of relative 
simplicity, stability, and professional ownership. In con-
trast, the English and Australian governments are in the 
midst of major redesign of primary care organizations, 
with the structures of GP-commissioning consortiums 
and Medicare Locals still to be determined. In any case, 
it seems apparent that primary care organizations have 
provided a valuable platform that allows governments (or, 
in the Netherlands, insurers) to reshape primary care to 
meet changing policy objectives. 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that the above 
strengths and lessons learned have manifested them-
selves in three countries with quite different underlying 
approaches to health system governance and influence. 
In broad terms, England has adopted a market-based 
approach; the Netherlands places strong reliance on pro-
fessionalism coupled with localism; and Australia uses 
an economic rationalist/managerial model. Despite these 
differences in how power manifests itself in the health 
care system, there has been remarkable policy conver-
gence in the primary care reform menu. This suggests 
that the international lessons in primary care reform 
discussed above could indeed translate to the United 
States and to other countries should policymakers be suf-
ficiently motivated.
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